In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder's bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner's-bid pricing rules.
Introduction
The concentration of ownership in an industry-a smaller number of firms, each of which owns a larger size of capacity-increases market power, and this results in price increases compared to a situation in which ownership is disperse. This has been well studied and documented in decentralized markets. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the concentration has the same anticompetitive effect in auction markets. This paper is motivated by some experiences in the reform of regulation of the electricity industry aiming at introducing competition at the generation level, usually characterized by a high degree of concentration. As an example of such experiences, the Spanish electricity industry is dominated by two major generators, Iberdrola and Endesa, which own most of the generation plants and set the market price at the pool near 90 per cent of the times. However, the bidding units in the pool are the generation plants, which must submit their price asks simultaneously. Obviously, the bids of the plants belonging to the same firm are not independent. In other words, firms have the ability to strategically choose the bids of their plants in a manner that can be different to the one we could expect if each plant were owned by a different firm. This ability allows the firms to increase the market price relative to a situation in which the ownership is disperse. How large is this price increase depends on the price formation rules of the mechanism.
In this paper we study a multi-unit auction mechanism for two units (the market demand), with four production plants-the bidders-with one unit production capacities, whose cost are independent draws of the same random variable. The two pants that submit the lowest bids are called to produce one unit each. We consider two different uniform-price auction formats, one with price equal to the bid of the last seller called to produce, and the other with price equal to the lowest unsuccessful bid.
We describe a concentrated ownership structure in which two firms own two plants each. Thus, a given firm decides on the bids of the two plants it owns. In principle, a bidding strategy of a firm could consist on a pair of bidding functions (one for each plant), each one depending on the costs of the two plants this firm owns. However, we show that at any symmetric equilibrium, and for either of the two auction formats, the bidding functions are independent in the sense that its bid depend on its cost (apart from its ranking among the plants of the same firm), and not on the cost of other plants of the same firm.
For the auction format with price equal to the highest successful bid, we show that there exists a monotone symmetric equilibrium in which the two types of pants (the more and the less efficient ones belonging to the same firm) use the same bidding function. Moreover, such function is the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of an auction for two units with the same price formation rules buy only three plants owned by independent firms. It is easy to check that this function is everywhere above the symmetric equilibrium one for the case of four independent plants. Thus, the concentration of the ownership induces the plants to bid higher compared to a situation with disperse ownership. More precisely, they bid as if there were just three plants in competition. Hence, the concentration has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. As the plants bid higher with concentrated ownership, the expected price is greater than with four independent plants, but it is lower than with three independent plants. Indeed, with three plants, the price is set by the plant with the second lowest of three realizations of the cost, whereas with concentrated ownership, the price is set by the one with the second lowest of four realizations. In other words, the concentration of the ownership increases the price with respect to a situation in which the plants belong to independent firms, but not as much as eliminating one plant.
More surprisingly, this equilibrium is efficient, as all plants bid according to a monotone increasing function, and hence, by scheduling the lowest bidders, the mechanism calls to produce the plants with the lowest costs.
For the auction format with price equal to the lowest unsuccessful bid, Vickrey [1] has shown that bidding the cost is a weakly dominant strategy when bidders can at most be awarded with one unit (in our model, this is as to say that ownership is disperse). Ausubel and Cramton [2] and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [3] analyze a mechanism in which (exchanging the roles of buyers and sellers) bidder can win more than one unit of an indivisible good 1 . For a bidder that desires more than one unit there is a positive probability that the bid for the second or latter units determines the price paid for the other units that he wins. Therefore, there is an incentive to bid truthfully on the first unit, but to shade the true valuation of the second and subsequent ones, in order to decrease the price of the unit it wins. Thus, there is a positive probability that the mechanism result in ex post inefficient allocations. There is also a recently increasing research analyzing alternative auction designs and pricing rules for wholesale electricity markets (see, for instance, Cramton et al. [5] , Federico and Rahman [6] , Fabra [7] , Cramton and Stoft [8] , and Tierney et al. [9] ).
Our model of concentrated ownership, where the plants bid for the right to supply the market demand, is equivalent to auction models where the bidder wants more than one unit. Thus, for the auction format where the price equals the lowest rejected bid our results are in line with those in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahns'; bidding the true cost of the first plant is a weakly dominant strategy, but the bid of the second plant must be above the cost. As in their model, inefficiencies arise as there is a tendency towards disseminating the units across firms more than what the relative costs would indicate. Moreover, also in line with their results, we show that there exists a continuum of monotone symmetric equilibria in which the market price is arbitrarily large.
Certainly, the efficiency result for the alternative auction format is special to the 2 × 2 × 2 model we analyze (although it is also true with some other special market configurations). Nevertheless, it points to better efficiency and revenues properties of an auction format that is more similar to a "pay your bid" auction, as compared to one more similar to second price auction 2 . Our claims is that the auction format with price equal to the best unsuccessful bid gives larger opportunities to tacit collusion among the bidders than the format with price equal to the worse successful bid. Indeed, in the former, all equilibria are inefficient, and the bidders have the ability to coordinate on "split award" equilibria at which they can increase the price with no bound.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and we prove the independence of the bidding functions. In Section 3 we examine the auction format with price equal to the highest successful bid, and we show that there exists an equilibrium in which all the plants bid according to the same bidding function. In Section 4 we analyze the auction with price equal to the lowest unsuccessful bid, and we show that there exists a collection of equilibria with price arbitrarily large. Section 5 contains some of the concluding remarks. The appendix contains some of the proof.
The unit costs of the plants are constant. They are independent draws of a random variable with cumulative density function F and distribution function f. The support of the distribution is   , c c . This is common knowledge. The cost of a plant is private information to the firm that owns the plant.
The market demand of the good is equal to two units for any price.
The sellers compete in a pool mechanism for the right to supply one unit of output. Each plant submits a bid that represents the price at which this plant offers this unit. The pool ranks the bids in ascending order and calls the two plants which submit the two lowest bids to produce. The auction is a uniform price one. That means that the two plants in the schedule are paid the same price. However, we consider two auction formats which differ in the manner this uniform price is determined. In one case, the price is equal to the bid of the last plant called to produce, that is, the highest successful bid. In the second case, the market price is equal to the lowest unsuccessful bid.
The Bidding Strategies
Each firm observes the costs of the plants it owns, that we denote by 1 and 2 , with 1 2 . Then, the firms simultaneously submits two bids each, 1 and 2 , with We look for symmetric equilibria of these games. Our first result, which applies to both auction formats, greatly simplifies this question. Proof. See the appendix. Thus, at any symmetric equilibrium any firm must behave as follows. First, it must observe the costs of its two plants in order to identify the one with the low cost 1 . Then, the firm assigns a bidding function to each plant, so that the plant with low cost bids according to the function 1 (depending only on the cost of the first plant), and the plant with the high cost bids according to the function 2 (depending only on its cost), where for any
The intuition behind this result is the following. Let us consider first a mechanism in which the uniform price is equal to the bid of the last plant called to produce. The bid 1 can affect the profits of the firm as much as it affects whether the first plant producer or not or if it affects the price this plant obtains. In particular, it cannot affect whether or not plant 2 produces or the price in the market when it happens. Hence, the bid must depend solely on .  . Again, these changes do not depend on 1 , and therefore, the optimum bidding function for plant 2 must depend only on .
Next we describe the conditions which define any strictly monotone symmetric equilibrium strategies for each of the two different price mechanisms we have considered. 2 . This occurs when the lowest rival bid is higher than
If plant 1 is the first one in the ranking and plant 2 is off the production schedule, then the price is equal to the lowest rival bid. The expected profits conditional on 1 being the first on the ranking and being strictly above the second position are
The denominator in this expression is the probability that the lowest rival bid is between and . 
Summarizing, the expected profits of a firm with costs and bidding and are
Setting the partial derivative with respect to equal to zero for
where 1 represents the derivative of the function
Second, if plant 1 was the second one in the ranking before raising the bid and moves to the third position (off the schedule) by increasing 1 . Then, the profits decrease by
This occurs with probability
The intuition behind this condition is the following. Suppose that the firm slightly increases 1 . This affects the profits of the firm only in two cases. First, if plant 1 is the second in the ranking before and after raising the bid, in which case the profits increase as much as the bid (the market price). This occurs with probability
Similarly, we obtain the F.O.C. with respect to 2 by setting the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to this variable equal to zero. That is
To understand this expression, again, suppose that the firm increases 2 by an infinitesimal amount (say b
Then, its profits change only in two cases. First, if plant 2 is at the second position in the ranking before and after raising the bid. In this case, the market price increases by  , and hence, the profits of the firm increase by 2
(notice that in this situation the two plants of the firm are called to produce). This occurs with probability These two effect must balance at the optimum bid   
Second, if the plant moves from the second to the third position by increasing 2 . Then, the profits of the firm fall by . This occurs with probability
The later condition is a usual one in asymmetric auctions when the support of the distribution of the cost is the same for the two type of bidders. Indeed, the differential system above and the boundary conditions define a problem which is very similar to that of an asymmetric auction with two type of bidders. In our case, each firm owns one plant of each type; the plant with the low cost for a given firm is of one type, say type 1, and the other is of type 2.
In our case, we know that   where the function b is a symmetric equilibrium bidding function in an auction for two objects (two units of demand) and three independent bidders, with price equal to the highest successful bid. The following proposition shows that there is a symmetric equilibrium with concentrated ownership in which the four plants bids according to the same bidding function and they all bid as if there were just three plants owned by independent firms. Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that   b c coincides with the bidding strategy of three independent bidders competing for two units when the price is the highest successful bid.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The bid 1 affects the profits of the firm only in case that plant 1 bidding 1 is the marginal plant. And if so, plant 2 is off the schedule with probability one. That is, at the marginal position, the competitors of plant 1 are the two rival plants which behave as independent bidders using a common bidding strategy b. This is the same situation as if there were just three plants in competition for the first and second positions in the ranking. Now consider the bid 2 . As before, 2 affects the profits of the firm only in case that plant 2 is the marginal one. If so, plant 1 is the first in the ranking and the firm produces two units. The gains from a higher price following an increase in 2 is now twice as much as the ones corresponding to higher . However, the "competition" faced when increasing 2 is also twice (two extramarginal rival plants, instead of one), and hence the probability of incurring in loses is also twice higher. Thus, the incentive of higher are exactly the same as 
Here, the right hand side represents the gains from increasing the bid if the plant is at the marginal position before and after the change, and the left hand side is the reduction of the profits if by increasing the bid the plant moves from the marginal to the position. This condition above coincides with the first order condition
of an auction for k and independent bidders and price equal to the lowest bid. Summarizing, in an auction with uniform price equal to the highest successful bid, the concentration of the ownership affects the bidding behaviour of the plants in the same manner as eliminating one plant. In other words, a single plant that belongs to a larger firm does not consider the other plant of the same firm as a real competitor. Hence, it is true that the concentration increases the expected market price relative to a situation with disperse ownership, but not as much as eliminating all but one of the plants that are merged. With four plants bidding as they were only three, the price is set by the plant whose cost is the second lowest of four independent draws of the same random variable, whereas when there are only three plants in competition, the cost of the marginal plant is the second lowest of three realizations of that random variable. To illustrate this point, when the random process is uniform in the interval   0,1 , the expected price with four independent plants is 0.6, whereas with concentrated ownership is 0.7 and with three independent
The condition above coincides with (6) when The fact that at the equilibrium defined by proposition 3 all the plants bid according to a common and monotone bidding function greatly simplifies the comparisons between the expected prices with concentrated and with disperse ownership. In addition, the fact that there is a unique and monotone function from costs to bids has a desirable consequence in terms of efficiency; by scheduling the lowest bidders, the mechanism calls to produce the plants with the lowest costs. plants is 0.75.
When the Lowest Unsuccessful Bid Sets the Price
Consider now a price mechanism in which the market price is equal to the bid of the plant at the third position in the ranking, that is, the lowest unsuccessful bid. Consider a firm with two plants and costs 1 If plants 1 and 2 are called to produce, the price is equal to the lowest rival bid. Hence, the expected profits of the firm conditional on its two plants operating are
where the denominator is the probability of this event.
If only plant 1 is operative (at the first or second position in the ranking) and plant is at the fourth position, then the price is set by the plant with the highest cost of the rival firm, which bids according to . Hence, the conditional expected profits are 
B B
 and the highest is above , and hence with probability
Summarizing, the expected profits of a firm with costs 1 and 2 bidding and , given that the rival firm bids according to and are c c 
As before, the equilibrium bidding functions must satisfy the F.O.C. of the problem. Setting the partial derivative of  with respect to equal to zero at
where represents the derivative of the function . 
B c c 
. On the one hand, 1 B c ) and taking into account that is the identity function, we have
The intuition behind this condition is the following. By changing 2 the firm may reduce its profits by (if plant 2 was the second plant in the ranking and becomes the third one after the change) or increase the profits as much as the market price (the bid 2 ) in case that plant 2 is at the third position before and after raising its bid. The optimum bidding function must balance this trade off for any cost . Corollary. At any symmetric equilibrium defined by, (9) the market price is higher than in the unique dominant strategy equilibrium with four independent plants with probability one. Also, the equilibrium is inefficient.
The equilibrium is inefficient in the sense that there is a positive probability that the plants that are called to produce are not the ones with the lowest cost; if the plant that sets the price is of type 2, it can occur that its cost is less than the most efficient rival plant which is scheduled. Moreover, in this case the market price is, with certainty, higher than when the four plants are independent-in which case the price is the third lowest cost, whereas with concentrated ownership, when a plant of type 2 sets the price it is because either it is the third most efficient one, bidding now above its cost, or either it is the second most efficient one, but bidding now above the three lowest costs. When a plant of type 1 sets the price, the allocation is efficient-the cost of the plant of type 2 that does produce is lower than the cost of that of type 1 that sets the price, as otherwise it would not have bid below that quantity, and the price is the same that would have prevailed with disperse ownership, as it is set by the third most efficient one which is of type 1 and, hence, bids its cost.
Summarizing, it the two plants of one firm are called to produce, the result of the auction process is the same that would have appeared with four independent plants. But is the mechanism calls to produce to one plant of each firm, then the price is, with certainty, higher than when ownership is disperse and, moreover, there is a positive probability that the allocation is inefficient.
Exchanging the roles of buyers and sellers, Vickrey (1962) showed that when a single bidder can obtain at most one unit (in our case this is as to say that the ownership is disperse), bidding the true valuation (the cost) is a weakly dominant strategy in this multi-unit auction where the price is determined by the best rejected bid. When a single bidder can obtain up to two units, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Khan (1998) find an incentive to bid truthfully for the first unit (the first plant) but to shade the bid of the second one. The reason is that, with some positive probability, the second bid determines the price for the units he obtains. Our findings are in the same direction; the bid for the first plant coincides with its cost, but the second plant bids above its cost. Thus, if the plant that sets the price is of type 2, the price is greater than with disperse ownership. Moreover, there is a positive probability that the cost of this plant setting the price-that is, off the schedule-is less than the cost of the last plant called to run. Hence, at this equilibrium inefficient allocations arise with positive probability.
Let us go back to the first F.O.C. (7). As we have seen before, this condition holds if 1 B is the identity function or, else, if the function 2 B is bounded below by some upper bound of 1 B . In fact, we will show that there is a collection of symmetric equilibria in which the plants of type 1 bid according to some bounded function 1 B and plants of type 2 bid some upper bound M of 1 B , atever the cost of the plant. for any 2 . A firm has not any incentive to bid more than zero for its first plant. By bidding anything less than c c this plant is scheduled with probability one, and the price is c or the bid of its second plant if less than c . And there are not incentives to bid less than c for the second plant, as this will only reduce the price for the first plant below c and the second plant is unable to enter into operation unless it submits a bid equal to zero.
To sum up, the concentration of the ownership is more harmful under this auction format with price equal to the lowest unsuccessful bid than with price equal to the lowest successful bid, both in terms of efficiency and price. Indeed, the price is, at any equilibrium of the type described by (10) in the former, with certainty, no less than the upper bound for the price in the later. To illustrate the different effects of the concentration on the price across the auction formats, when the random process is uniform in   0,1 , the price in the most favourable equilibria described by (10) is 1, whereas the expected price when it is set equal to the lowest successful bid it is 0.7. This means that in the first case, the expected price is a 66 per cent higher than with disperse ownership, whereas in the later the increment is of 16 per cent.
Conclusions
The concentration of the ownership in auction markets implies that a single bidder submits bids for the different units offered, and it may win more than one unit. It is already known (see, for instance, Ausubel and Cramton (1998) ) that when a bidder can be awarded with more than one unit, uniform-price auctions for multiple units do not inherit the desirable efficiency and revenue properties of the auctions for a single object, except in very particular settings (as, for instance, with pure common values). The reason is that in these multi-unit auctions the bidders have an incentive to shade their true cost (or valuation), as their bid for one unit affects with positive probability the price of the other units they win.
Inefficiency is not a result of this shading per se, but rather a consequence of differential bid shading; for a
The auction format with price equal to the best unsuccessful bid has been well studied by Ausubel and Cramton (1998) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Khan (1998), among others. In line with their results, and exchanging the roles of buyers and sellers, differential bid shading appears in our model as bidders have not an incentive to shade their first bid, since it cannot affect the price that this bidder gets. But there is a positive probability that the bid for the second unit determines the price of the first. Hence, the bidders increase this second bid in an attempt to increases the price they receive for the first unit. Indeed, in equilibrium, they can increase it with no bound.
In the auction format with price equal to the worst successful bid, we find that the incentives for bid shading are stronger when the ownership is concentrated than when each plant is an independent firm. This causes that the expected price is higher when ownership is concentrated.
More surprisingly, there are some special markets configurations for which we find bid shading, but not differential bid shading. In our 2 × 2 × 2 case (two units, two firms and two plants each) there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all the plants bid according to the same bidding function. More precisely, they bid as in a symmetric equilibrium for this auction format with three bidders that can win up to one unit. Of course, this function lies everywhere above the symmetric equilibrium bidding function for the case with disperse ownership, and this implies that the expected price is higher, but not as much as it would with three independent plants. Symmetry and monotonicity guarantee efficient outcomes.
Summarizing, the two auction formats we analyze create incentives to strategic bid shading when a single bidder can win several units, but, at least for this 2 × 2 × 2 and some other special market configurations, the auction format with price equal to the highest successful bid dominates any equilibrium of the former, alternative uniform-price auction format both in terms of price and in terms of efficiency.
As and the interior of are complementary sets, it holds that
